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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
The Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence has often been 
criticized.  Judges and scholars have contended that existing Establishment 
Clause tests give courts too little guidance and too much discretion.1  Some 
judges and advocates have been calling on the Court to replace those existing 
tests with a test that compares challenged practices to long-standing historically 
accepted ones.2 
But that would be a very bad idea.  Such a historical-practice test would be 
much more difficult to apply than the Court’s current jurisprudence.  Switching 
to a historical-practice test would only engender greater confusion among lower 
courts than there is now. 
Proponents of a historical-practice test want to expand to all Establishment 
Clause cases the history-based analysis of the Supreme Court’s two cases 
concerning opening prayers before legislative bodies3—Marsh v. Chambers4 
and Town of Greece v. Galloway.5  The Supreme Court concluded in Marsh that 
legislative prayer is constitutional because, in 1789, Congress authorized public 
funding of legislative chaplains just three days before approving the language of 
the First Amendment. 6   The Court reasoned, therefore, that the First 
Amendment’s framers could not have thought that its Establishment Clause 
prohibits legislative prayer.7  The Court also emphasized that the practice of 
legislative prayer has continued in Congress from 1789 through the present, 
without interruption.8 
Attempting to apply this kind of analysis to other types of Establishment 
Clause controversies would raise some problematic questions, however.  First, 
whose actions should be relevant?  Only actions of the federal government 
should matter, not actions by state or local governments.9  That’s because the 
Establishment Clause did not govern the states when the Bill of Rights was 
passed; it was the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 that 
rendered the Establishment Clause applicable to the states, and the Supreme 
Court did not recognize this until the 1940s.10  So eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century actions by state or local governments cannot properly be treated as 
evidence of how the Establishment Clause was originally understood.  Indeed, 
                                                 
 1. See infra Section II.A. 
 2. See infra Section II.C. 
 3. See infra Sections II.B, II.C. 
 4. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784 (1983). 
 5. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 569–70 (2014). 
 6. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 787–88, 790. 
 7. Id. at 790. 
 8. Id. at 788, 790. 
 9. See infra Section III.A.1. 
 10. See infra text accompanying notes 105–07. 
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in 1789 and long after, state and local governments engaged in conduct that 
egregiously violated the Establishment Clause—for example, by maintaining 
established churches and religious tests for office.11 
Second, what time frame should be relevant?  The further past the 1789 
enactment of the First Amendment one looks, the less likely it is that federal-
government action can be treated as consistent with the First Amendment’s 
intent.12  For the composition of Congress changes every two years, and the 
understanding of an enactment’s intent grows dimmer over time.13  Indeed, in 
1798, less than a decade after approving the language of the First Amendment, 
Congress passed the Sedition Act14—a law that has long been condemned as 
plainly unconstitutional because it made criticizing federal officials or the 
United States a crime.15  Therefore, only federal-government actions that took 
place in 1789 or shortly thereafter should be considered as potential indicators 
of how the Establishment Clause was originally understood. 
This limited universe of federal actions may be sufficient in the legislative-
prayer area, given Congress’s authorization of legislative chaplains just three 
days before its approval of the language of the First Amendment, together with 
the unbroken continuance of legislative prayer in Congress since then.16  But in 
most Establishment Clause contexts, there are no federal-government actions 
during the relevant historical period that courts can consider for guidance.17 For 
example, Establishment Clause cases often concern the role of religion in the 
public schools, but free public education was virtually nonexistent in the late 
eighteenth century.18  Religious displays on public property are another common 
source of Establishment Clause controversy, but the first federal monument is 
believed to have been erected in 1808. 19   One other regularly litigated 
Establishment Clause issue is the extent to which the Clause prohibits religious 
exemptions from employment-discrimination or public-accommodations laws, 
but in the late eighteenth century there were no federal laws barring 
discrimination by employers or businesses.20  Establishment Clause cases also 
often relate to whether government can provide public funding to religious 
schools or religious social-service providers, but in the late eighteenth century 
                                                 
 11. See infra text accompanying notes 109–17. 
 12. See infra Section III.A.2. 
 13. See infra text accompanying notes 124–29. 
 14. Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798). 
 15. See infra text accompanying notes 130–32. 
 16. See infra text accompanying note 154. 
 17. See infra Section III.B.1. 
 18. See infra text accompanying notes 158–66. 
 19. See infra text accompanying notes 167–74. 
 20. See infra text accompanying notes 175–76. 
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the federal government was not funding general education or social-service 
programs.21 
Indeed, opinions and briefs that advocate an Establishment Clause analysis 
focusing on long-standing historical practices identify only three arguably 
relevant actions that were taken by the federal government close in time to 
Congress’s approval of the First Amendment: (1) the creation of the 
congressional chaplaincies; (2) Congress’s passage in 1789 of a resolution 
asking the president to issue Thanksgiving proclamations; and (3) Congress’s 
authorization in 1791 of chaplains in the military. 22   Even assuming that 
legislative prayer, Thanksgiving proclamations, and military chaplains are 
consistent with the Establishment Clause’s intent (the First Amendment’s 
leading architects, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, thought that they 
weren’t), they provide little guidance for how to resolve the kinds of 
Establishment Clause cases that commonly confront the courts today.23  For 
legislative prayer is a ceremonial act that is principally directed at legislators 
themselves, not the public.24  The Thanksgiving proclamations given by early 
presidents were nonsectarian, ecumenical, isolated written statements that were 
not presented in coercive environments.25  And military chaplains are viewed as 
necessary to enable members of the military to practice their religions, for 
soldiers often are in places where they otherwise would not have access to 
clergy. 26   None of these practices is helpful to determining how the 
Establishment Clause should be applied in the coercive setting of public schools, 
to permanent and prominent sectarian displays, to requests on religious grounds 
for exemptions from anti-discrimination laws, or to the provision of substantial 
sums of public funds to private religious institutions. 
And even if there were more relevant historical practices against which 
current practices could be measured, how exactly are courts to compare modern 
practices with historical ones?  Justice Kennedy, in a partially concurring and 
partially dissenting opinion in County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh 
Chapter, advocated for a historical-practice test that “must permit not only 
legitimate practices two centuries old but also any other practices with no greater 
potential for an establishment of religion.”27  How is one to judge whether one 
                                                 
 21. See infra text accompanying notes 177–79. 
 22. See infra text accompanying notes 238–40. 
 23. See infra text accompanying notes 241–47. 
 24. See infra text accompanying note 248. 
 25. See infra text accompanying note 249. 
 26. See infra text accompanying notes 250–51. 
 27. County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 670 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
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practice has a “greater potential for an establishment of religion” 28  than 
another?29 
All that said, we do not contend that there should be no role for history in 
Establishment Clause analysis.  But what is proper for courts to principally 
consider are the historical events that led to the Clause’s creation, not the events 
that occurred after the Clause was adopted. 30   And such proper historical 
analysis does not require the Supreme Court to reinvent the wheel.  For the 
Supreme Court already engaged in such analysis in devising its existing 
Establishment Clause tests, looking at European and colonial history to 
understand what kinds of practices the First Amendment’s framers wanted to 
stop, as well as the writings of the leading thinkers behind the Establishment 
Clause, Madison and Jefferson.31 
Already informed by history, the Supreme Court’s existing Establishment 
Clause tests well protect the values underlying the Clause, prohibiting (among 
other conduct) public funding of religious activity, governmental favoritism for 
any religion over another or for religion over nonreligion, governmental 
coercion to take part in religious exercise, and governmental entanglement with 
religion.32  Abandoning these clear rules for a vague and amorphous historical-
practice test would harm those values, in addition to confusing judges.33  The 
Court should not venture down this ill-advised path. 
II. THE SUGGESTIONS THAT CURRENT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
JURISPRUDENCE BE REPLACED WITH A HISTORICAL-PRACTICE TEST 
A. Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence and Criticism of It 
The polestar of Establishment Clause analysis has long been a three-part test 
known as the Lemon test, named after one of the cases that set it forth, Lemon v. 
Kurtzman.34  At the most general level, the test asks whether governmental 
action has a primary purpose of advancing religion, has a principal effect of 
doing the same, or fosters excessive governmental entanglement with religion.35 
More specifically, the Supreme Court has enunciated a number of particular 
ways in which an unconstitutional effect of advancing religion may be shown.  
For example, the government must not favor or endorse any religion over 
                                                 
 28. Id. 
 29. See infra text accompanying notes 252–53. 
 30. See infra text accompanying note 254. 
 31. See infra text accompanying notes 255–84. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See infra text accompanying note 285. 
 34. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 35. See id. at 612–13; see also, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859–
60 (2005); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648–49 (2002); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. 
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). 
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another or religion over nonreligion.36  It must not coerce anyone to participate 
in religion or its exercise.37  It must not provide funding for religious instruction 
or activity.38  It must not delegate governmental power to religious institutions.39 
Despite these detailed rules, the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
has often been criticized as vague and difficult to apply.40  For a replacement 
test, critics of the existing jurisprudence have looked to a history-oriented 
analysis that has thus far been applied by a majority of the Court as a principal 
test only in the Court’s two cases concerning prayer at the opening of sessions 
of legislative bodies, Marsh v. Chambers41 and Town of Greece v. Galloway.42 
B. The Supreme Court’s Limited Use of Historical-Practice Analysis 
In Marsh, the Supreme Court considered the Nebraska state legislature’s 
practice of employing a publicly funded chaplain to open its sessions with 
prayer.43  The Eighth Circuit had applied the Lemon test to hold the practice 
unconstitutional.44   But the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that “[t]he 
opening of sessions of legislative and other deliberative public bodies with 
prayer is deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country.”45 
The Court emphasized that the First Congress passed a statute providing 
public funding for congressional chaplains on September 22, 1789, and that just 
three days later Congress approved the final language of the Bill of Rights.46  In 
the Court’s view, therefore, “the men who wrote the First Amendment Religion 
Clause did not view paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a violation 
of that Amendment.”47  “It can hardly be thought,” explained the Court, 
that in the same week Members of the First Congress voted to appoint 
and to pay a [C]haplain for each House and also voted to approve the 
                                                 
 36. See, e.g., McCreary, 545 U.S. at 875–76; Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 
308, 316 (2000); County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 592–
94 (1989), dicta on different issue disapproved by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 
579–80 (2014). 
 37. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 310–12; Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 
587 (1992). 
 38. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 840 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 219, 228 (1997); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 
621 (1988). 
 39. See Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982). 
 40. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398–400 
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 41. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790–92 (1983). 
 42. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 575–79 (2014). 
 43. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784. 
 44. Id. at 786. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 788. 
 47. Id. 
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draft of the First Amendment for submission to the States, they 
intended the Establishment Clause of the Amendment to forbid what 
they had just declared acceptable.48 
“In this context,” the Court added, “historical evidence sheds light not only on 
what the draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how 
they thought that Clause applied to the practice authorized by the First 
Congress—their actions reveal their intent.”49   The Court also stressed that 
Congress’s “practice of opening sessions with prayer has continued without 
interruption ever since” the First Congress.50 
Yet the Court was careful to limit the reach of its historical analysis to the 
unusual circumstances before it.  “Standing alone,” cautioned the Court, 
“historical patterns cannot justify contemporaneous violations of constitutional 
guarantees.”51  “[B]ut,” declared the Court, “there is far more here than simply 
historical patterns.”52  The close temporal proximity of Congress’s approval of 
publicly funded legislative chaplains and its approval of the language of the 
Establishment Clause, together with the fact that legislative prayer has continued 
in Congress without interruption since 1789, combined for a “unique history.”53  
The Court accordingly upheld the practice of legislative prayer “[i]n light of 
th[is] unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years.”54 
Notwithstanding the care the Marsh Court took to cabin the circumstances in 
which its historical analysis could apply, some Supreme Court Justices have 
attempted to broaden the use of historical-practice analysis to other 
Establishment Clause contexts.  Just one year after Marsh, in Lynch v. Donnelly, 
the Court upheld by a 5–4 vote a city holiday display that contained a crèche, 
along with numerous secular symbols.55  The Court’s opinion documented at 
length what it characterized as “an unbroken history of official acknowledgment 
by all three branches of government of the role of religion in American life from 
at least 1789.”56  The Court, however, ultimately used the traditional Lemon test 
to rule that the holiday display was constitutional.57  And Justice O’Connor, 
despite technically joining the majority’s opinion and providing the fifth vote 
for it, wrote a separate concurrence in which she argued that the principal 
                                                 
 48. Id. at 790. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 788. 
 51. Id. at 790. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 791. 
 54. Id. at 792. 
 55. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671, 687 (1984). 
 56. Id. at 674–78. 
 57. See id. at 679–85. 
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Establishment Clause test should be whether a practice has a purpose or effect 
of endorsing religion.58 
In its 1989 decision in County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh 
Chapter, a majority of the Court accepted Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test, 
upholding one holiday display and striking down another.59  Justice Kennedy, 
however, wrote a partially concurring and partially dissenting opinion, joined by 
three other Justices, that advocated a much broader use of historical-practice 
analysis than what Marsh had permitted.60  He argued that “whatever standard 
the Court applies to Establishment Clause claims, it must at least suggest results 
consistent with our precedents and the historical practices that, by tradition, have 
informed our First Amendment jurisprudence.”61  Justice Kennedy proposed 
that “the relevance of history” should not be “confined to the inquiry into 
whether the challenged practice itself is a part of our accepted traditions dating 
back to the Founding.”62  Rather, in his view, “the meaning of the Clause is to 
be determined by reference to historical practices and understandings.” 63  
Specifically, “[w]hatever test we choose to apply must permit not only legitimate 
practices two centuries old but also any other practices with no greater potential 
for an establishment of religion.”64 
An analysis focusing on historical practices again failed to gain approval of a 
Court majority in the 2005 decision Van Orden v. Perry.65  There, by a 5–4 vote, 
the Court upheld the display of a Ten Commandments monument on state capitol 
grounds that also featured numerous secular displays.66  A four-Justice plurality 
spent much of its opinion cataloguing past “official acknowledgment by all three 
branches of government of religion’s role in American life” and “of the role 
played by the Ten Commandments in our Nation’s heritage.”67  The plurality did 
not attempt to enunciate any particular historical-practice test—or, for that 
matter, any test—that it felt should govern religious-display or other 
Establishment Clause cases, however.68  Moreover, Justice Breyer, the fifth 
Justice in the majority, refused to join the plurality’s analysis and instead wrote 
                                                 
 58. See id. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 59. County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 592–94 (1989), 
dicta on different issue disapproved by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 579–80 (2014). 
 60. Id. at 669–74 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 61. Id. at 669. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 670. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
 66. Id. at 681 & n.1, 691–92 (plurality opinion). 
 67. Id. at 686–89 (plurality opinion). 
 68. See id. at 686 (plurality opinion). 
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a separate concurrence that focused on whether the monument was divisive and 
its content, setting, and purpose.69 
Subsequently, in the 2014 legislative-prayer case Town of Greece v. 
Galloway, a Supreme Court majority—as in Marsh—applied a historical-
practice analysis.70  The Court held that it was permissible for legislative prayers 
to contain expressly sectarian references, emphasizing that sectarian legislative 
prayers date back to the First Congress and have continued ever since.71  In so 
ruling, the Court relied heavily on Marsh, stating that “[t]he case teaches . . . that 
the Establishment Clause must be interpreted ‘by reference to historical practices 
and understandings.’”72 
But as in Marsh, the Court was careful to limit the reach of such historical 
analysis.  The Court cautioned that “Marsh must not be understood as permitting 
a practice that would amount to a constitutional violation if not for its historical 
foundation.”73  Rather, “Marsh stands for the proposition that it is not necessary 
to define the precise boundary of the Establishment Clause where history shows 
that the specific practice is permitted.”74  In other words, “[a]ny test the Court 
adopts must acknowledge a practice that [1] was accepted by the Framers and 
[2] has withstood the critical scrutiny of time and political change.”75 
Greece did not point to any practices outside the legislative-prayer context 
that meet these two requirements, however.  Indeed, far from holding that 
challenged practices must be measured against historical practices in all 
Establishment Clause contexts, Greece applied long-standing standard 
Establishment Clause rules in the legislative-prayer context.  In addition to 
conducting a historical analysis, the opinion relied on the principles that 
government must not become excessively “involve[d] . . . in religious matters,”76 
must “maintain[] a policy of nondiscrimination” instead of favoring one faith 
                                                 
 69. See id. at 698–705 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 70. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 577–79 (2014). 
 71. Id. at 578–79. 
 72. Id. at 576 (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 
573, 670 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 577. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 581 (citing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 
171, 188–89 (2012)). 
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over another,77 must not “coerce its citizens ‘to support or participate in any 
religion or its exercise,’”78 and must not “proselytize . . . constituents.”79 
Most recently, in American Legion v. American Humanist Ass’n, some 
Supreme Court Justices again pushed for an expanded use of the historical-
practice analysis, but the Court’s majority opinion followed a quite different 
path.80  American Legion upheld the display of a cross as a war memorial on 
public property.81  In a plurality opinion, four Justices argued that the Lemon test 
should no longer be applied in cases involving “longstanding” “use[s], for 
ceremonial, celebratory, or commemorative purposes of words or symbols with 
religious associations.”82   The plurality contended that these kinds of cases 
should be decided by “focus[ing] on the particular issue at hand and look[ing] 
to history for guidance.”83   Principally relying on the history of legislative 
prayer, and mentioning several other types of late-eighteenth-century 
governmental actions as well, the plurality then concluded that “categories of 
monuments, symbols, and practices with a longstanding history” are 
“constitutional” if they reflect “respect and tolerance for differing views, an 
honest endeavor to achieve inclusivity and nondiscrimination, and a recognition 
of the important role that religion plays in the lives of many Americans.”84 
The sections of the American Legion opinion that garnered a majority did not 
compare the cross display at issue to historical practices that date back to the 
Founding Era, however. 85   The majority opinion made only limited use of 
history, mainly considering the particular history of the cross itself and what it 
was understood to mean when it was erected.86  In upholding the cross, the 
majority emphasized that (1) the cross communicated a secular message of 
honoring local soldiers who perished during World War I;87 (2) all the individual 
soldiers honored by the cross apparently happened to be Christians;88 (3) the 
cross’s designers did not have “discriminatory intent” toward religious 
                                                 
 77. Id. at 585; accord McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 875 (2005). 
 78. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 586 (plurality opinion) (quoting County of Allegheny v. 
ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part)); accord Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992). 
 79. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 587 (plurality opinion) (citing Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 
700, 720–21 (2010) (plurality opinion); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 
(2000)). 
 80. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019). 
 81. Id. at 2090. 
 82. Id. at 2081–82 (plurality opinion). 
 83. Id. at 2087 (plurality opinion). 
 84. Id. at 2088–89 (plurality opinion). 
 85. See id. at 2074–75, 2082–2087, 2089–91 (majority opinion). 
 86. See id. at 2074–78, 2089–90 (majority opinion). 
 87. See id. at 2089 (majority opinion). 
 88. See id. at 2077, 2090 (majority opinion). 
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minorities;89 (4) many nonreligious monuments were erected near the cross;90 
and (5) removing the cross would send a divisive message of “hostility to 
religion.”91  In other words, though it did not say that it was applying the Lemon 
test, the majority analyzed whether the cross had a purpose or effect of 
advancing religion—Lemon’s principal criteria.92 
C. Recent Arguments for Expansion of Historical-Practice Analysis 
Even though Greece strictly cabined how far historical analysis should extend 
in Establishment Clause cases and applied traditional Establishment Clause 
tests, and even though the American Legion majority did not apply a historical-
practice test, some judges and advocates have argued—incorrectly—that Greece 
and American Legion replaced existing Establishment Clause jurisprudence with 
a historical-practice test, or at least that the Supreme Court should do so.  For 
example, in New Doe Child #1 v. United States, a case that challenged the use 
of the phrase “In God We Trust” on U.S. currency, two of a three-judge panel’s 
members joined an opinion that took the position that Greece issued an 
“unqualified directive that the Establishment Clause ‘must’ be interpreted 
according to historical practices and understandings” and that “this historical 
approach is not limited to a particular factual context.”93  But as of this writing, 
in the five years since Greece was decided, New Doe Child has been the only 
appellate opinion known to the authors in which a majority of a panel took this 
position and relied principally on a historical-practice analysis to decide an 
Establishment Clause case outside the legislative-prayer area. 
Other judges have floated similar arguments in concurring or dissenting 
opinions.  For instance, in a concurrence in Kondrat’yev v. City of Pensacola 
(another case concerning a cross on public property), an Eleventh Circuit judge 
argued that “Greece states an unequivocal, exceptionless rule . . . : ‘[T]he 
Establishment Clause must be interpreted by reference to historical practices and 
understandings.’”94  In a dissenting opinion in Felix v. City of Bloomfield, a 
Tenth Circuit judge called on the Circuit to “reexamine [its] Establishment 
Clause cases” and “return[] to a more historically-congruent understanding of 
the Establishment Clause.”95  And in a concurrence in Smith v. Jefferson County 
                                                 
 89. See id. at 2074 (majority opinion). 
 90. See id. at 2077, 2089 (majority opinion). 
 91. See id. at 2087 (majority opinion). 
 92. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
 93. New Doe Child #1 v. United States, 901 F.3d 1015, 1020 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Town 
of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014)). 
 94. Kondrat’yev v. City of Pensacola, 903 F.3d 1169, 1179 (11th Cir. 2018) (Newsom, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 576), vacated and remanded, 139 S. Ct. 2772 (2019). 
 95. Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 847 F.3d 1214, 1220–21 (10th Cir.) (Kelly, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 357 (2017). 
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Board of School Commissioners, a Sixth Circuit judge expressed the view that 
“Greece is apparently a major doctrinal shift regarding the Establishment 
Clause, declaring a two-pronged test for Establishment Clause cases, a test based 
upon the historical approach . . . and adding the [anti-]coercion principle.”96 
Though contentions that the federal courts should expand the historical-
practice analysis of Marsh and Greece beyond the legislative-prayer context 
have gained little traction with judges, certain advocates have continued to press 
the Supreme Court and the circuit courts to do so.  For example, one amicus 
brief filed in American Legion in support of the cross display argued that the 
Court should replace the Lemon test with the test that Justice Kennedy proposed 
in his Allegheny opinion: a practice is constitutional if it “is a part of our accepted 
traditions dating back to the Founding” or has “no greater potential for an 
establishment of religion.”97  Another amicus brief filed in American Legion 
similarly advocated jettisoning Lemon in favor of a test that asks whether a 
challenged “activity ‘fits within the tradition long followed’ throughout the 
Nation.”98  In Kondrat’yev, an amicus brief argued for adoption of an “analysis” 
that “look[s] to American history as a whole to determine whether the practice 
at issue is part of our heritage and tradition, part of our expressive idiom.”99  And 
a supplemental brief in Kondrat’yev contended that, under American Legion, the 
Kondrat’yev cross display should be compared to monuments erected long 
ago.100 
III. QUESTIONS ABOUT AND FLAWS OF A HISTORICAL-PRACTICE 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TEST 
Instead of making the law clearer, abandoning existing Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence in favor of a historical-practice test such as the one Justice 
Kennedy proposed in Allegheny would provide courts much less guidance than 
they have now.  That is principally because there are very few historical practices 
to which current practices can properly be compared.101   To find historical 
practices that might legitimately be viewed as reflecting the intent of the First 
                                                 
 96. Smith v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 788 F.3d 580, 602 (6th Cir. 2015) 
(Batchelder, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result). 
 97. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Am. Ctr. for Law & Justice in Support of Petitioners at 11–
13, American Legion v. American Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019) (No. 17-1717), 2018 
WL 3159307 (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 
669 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)). 
 98. Corrected Brief Amicus Curiae of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty in Support of 
Petitioners at 10, American Legion, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (No. 17-1717), 2018 WL 3159307 (quoting 
Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577). 
 99. Brief of the Int’l Mun. Lawyers Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants at 14, 
Kondrat’yev v. City of Pensacola, 903 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-13025), vacated and 
remanded, 139 S. Ct. 2772 (2019). 
 100. Appellants’ Supplemental Brief at 12–13, Kondrat’yev, 903 F.3d 1169 (No. 17-13025). 
 101. See infra text accompanying notes 105–253. 
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Amendment’s framers, one must look only at federal practices, not state or local 
actions, because the First Amendment originally applied only to the federal 
government.102  Moreover, one must consider only federal actions that occurred 
in 1789 or shortly thereafter, for less than a decade later, Congress had come to 
pass legislation that plainly violated the First Amendment.103  The few federal 
actions relating to religion that satisfy these criteria shed little light on how to 
resolve most kinds of Establishment Clause controversies that confront courts 
today.104 
A. What Kinds of Historical Practices Legitimately Shed Light on the Intent of 
the Establishment Clause’s Framers? 
Before proceeding with any attempt to apply historical-practice analysis 
similar to that of Marsh and Greece to ascertain the intent of the Establishment 
Clause’s framers, one must first determine what kinds of historical practices can 
legitimately be considered as evidence of that intent.  There are two principal 
questions: Whose actions are relevant?  And what time frame is relevant? 
1. Whose Actions Are Relevant? 
Which governmental bodies’ actions can properly be viewed as potentially 
evincing the intent of the First Amendment’s framers?  Only actions of the 
federal government—and not state or local actions—can legitimately provide 
guidance.  That is because the First Amendment did not apply to the states when 
the Bill of Rights was enacted.105  It was the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, in 1868, that rendered the First Amendment applicable to the 
states.106  And the Supreme Court did not recognize that the Establishment 
Clause governed the actions of the states until the 1940s.107 
Therefore, pre-1868—and arguably pre-1940s—actions by state and local 
governments cannot legitimately be considered as evidence of what the 
Establishment Clause was intended to allow.  Indeed, in 1789 and long 
thereafter, many state and local governments engaged in conduct that 
egregiously violated the Establishment Clause.108 
At the time Congress approved the Bill of Rights, for example, six states 
maintained established churches: Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, 
                                                 
 102. See infra text accompanying notes 105–19. 
 103. See infra text accompanying notes 120–53. 
 104. See infra text accompanying notes 238–53. 
 105. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985). 
 106. Id. 
 107. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 5, 14–15 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
 108. See infra text accompanying notes 109–17. 
666 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 68:653 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and South Carolina.109  Connecticut did not 
disestablish until 1818, New Hampshire until 1819, and Massachusetts—the last 
state to maintain an established church—until 1833.110 
Moreover, most of the states had religious tests for holding office during the 
late eighteenth century.111  Some of these restrictions limited office-holding to 
Protestants; some others limited it to Christians.112  Many of these restrictions 
remained in place well into the nineteenth century or even beyond: for instance, 
Pennsylvania’s stayed in place until 1874, New Hampshire’s until 1877, and 
Maryland’s restriction—which at its end limited office-holding to believers in 
God—remained on the books until the Supreme Court struck it down in Torcaso 
v. Watkins in 1961.113 
In addition, many states’ constitutions had other provisions that denied non-
Christians full civil rights or otherwise favored Christians during the late 
eighteenth century.  For instance, according to Douglas Laycock, at least five 
states “denied full civil rights to Catholics.”114  Pennsylvania reaffirmed in 1790 
its Bill of Rights of 1776, leaving in a provision stating that no man “who 
acknowledges the being of a God” could be deprived of civil rights. 115  
Pennsylvania law also made it a crime to “willfully, premeditatedly, and 
despitefully blaspheme, or speak lightly or profanely of Almighty God, Christ 
Jesus, the Holy Spirit, or the Scriptures of Truth.” 116   And, until 1968, 
New Hampshire’s Bill of Rights provided that “[e]very denomination of 
Christians, demeaning themselves quietly and as good subjects of the state, shall 
be equally under the protection of the law.”117 
                                                 
 109. See Daniel O. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 NW. U. 
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 110. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 255 n.20 (1963) (Brennan, 
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Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875, 916 (1986). 
 112. See J. Jackson Barlow, Officeholding: Religious-Based Limitations in Eighteenth-Century 
State Constitutions, in RELIGION AND AMERICAN LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 346–48 (Paul 
Finkelman ed., 2000). 
 113. See id.; Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961). 
 114. See Laycock, supra note 111, at 916. 
 115. See Barlow, supra note 112, at 347 (internal citation omitted). 
 116. See Cobb, supra note 110, at 516 (internal citation omitted). 
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As the Establishment Clause did not apply to the states when it was enacted, 
and as many states engaged in conduct that egregiously violated the Clause when 
it was approved and long after, even Justices who have appeared favorably 
disposed to a historical-practice test have agreed that only actions of the federal 
government should be relevant.  In his Allegheny opinion, where he proposed 
his historical-practice test, Justice Kennedy also wrote (joined by Justices 
Rehnquist, Scalia, and White): 
[T]he relevant historical practices are those conducted by 
governmental units which were subject to the constraints of the 
Establishment Clause.  Acts . . . perpetrated in the 18th and 19th 
centuries by States and municipalities are of course irrelevant to this 
inquiry, but the practices of past Congresses and Presidents are highly 
informative.118 
Similarly, in a concurring opinion in Greece, Justice Alito (joined by Justice 
Scalia) wrote that “what is important” in historical-practice analysis of 
legislative prayer “is . . . what happened before congressional sessions during 
the period leading up to the adoption of the First Amendment.”119 
2. What Time Frame is Relevant? 
The second principal question about how to properly apply Marsh/Greece-
style historical analysis is what time frame should be relevant?  Recall that 
Congress agreed on the final language of the Bill of Rights on September 25, 
1789.120  How far past that date can federal-government actions colorably be 
considered presumptively consistent with the intent of the First Amendment’s 
framers? 
Before answering that question, we note that its very premise is shaky.  The 
assumption that actions of the First Congress are necessarily consistent with 
constitutional intent is quite questionable (though we accept this assumption 
arguendo for purposes of this article).  The First Amendment was not even 
ratified until December 1791,121 after the First Congress had concluded,122 so 
the Amendment technically was never even in force when the First Congress 
served.  More importantly, as Justice Brennan wrote in his dissent in Marsh, 
Legislators, influenced by the passions and exigencies of the moment, 
the pressure of constituents and colleagues, and the press of business, 
do not always pass sober constitutional judgment on every piece of 
                                                 
 118. County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 670 n.7 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 119. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 600 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 120. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788 (1983). 
 121. See Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 122. See Dates of Sessions of the Congress, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/ 
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legislation they enact, and this must be assumed to be as true of the 
members of the First Congress as any other.123 
To assume that members of the First Congress always acted consistently with 
constitutional intent is to put them on a pedestal that ignores that they were 
human politicians with the same flaws and weaknesses that have always affected 
people in power. 
Keeping that starting point in mind, it must be the case that the further past 
the approval of the First Amendment one looks, the less likely it becomes that 
federal-government action would be consistent with the original understanding 
of the First Amendment.  Memories fade as time passes, and the understanding 
of a constitutional provision’s intent thus grows dimmer with the passage of 
time.  As time ticks on, the importance of complying with a constitutional clause 
one may have voted for may also lessen.  Thus, even those who served in the 
First Congress might have become more prone to vote for unconstitutional 
legislation when they served in later Congresses. 
And there was substantial turnover from Congress to Congress in the 1790s, 
much more so than today.124  The First Congress—the one that approved the Bill 
of Rights—met from March 1789 to March 1791.125  Of a total of 103 members 
who served in the Second Congress, which met from March 1791 to March 
1793,126 42 had not served in the First Congress.127  By the Fifth Congress, 
which met from March 1797 to March 1799,128 only 23 out of a total 162 
members had served in the First.129  Because Congress had fewer and fewer 
members, as the 1790s passed, who had served when the Bill of Rights was 
approved, congressional action became progressively less likely during that 
                                                 
 123. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 814–15 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
 124. See WILLIAM T. EGAR, CONG. RES. SERV., R41545, CONGRESSIONAL CAREERS: 
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decade to reflect an accurate understanding of the intent of constitutional 
protections. 
So it is not surprising that in 1798, less than a decade after approving the First 
Amendment, Congress passed the Sedition Act.130  The statute made it a crime, 
punishable by imprisonment, to criticize federal officials or the United States.131  
Though it expired in 1801 and therefore never reached the Supreme Court, the 
Sedition Act is roundly considered to have been unconstitutional.132 
But one need not move forward a decade in time from the enactment of the 
Bill of Rights to find examples of congressional actions whose constitutionality 
was, at best, highly doubtful.  Just seven months after approving the Bill of 
Rights, the First Congress itself passed “An Act for the Punishment of certain 
Crimes against the United States.”133  This law required that people convicted of 
certain theft crimes “be publicly whipped, not exceeding thirty-nine stripes.”134  
The law is now considered to have been contrary to the intent of the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.135  Not long after, 
paying even less regard to the Eighth Amendment—which is now understood as 
barring capital punishment for crimes against individuals when the victim’s life 
is not taken136—the Second Congress passed a law imposing the death penalty 
on any employee of the United States post office convicted of stealing mail with 
money or other financial instruments in it.137 
What is more, the very first act struck down by the Supreme Court as 
unconstitutional was passed by the First Congress.  In Marbury v. Madison, the 
Supreme Court held that a section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that gave the 
Supreme Court power to issue writs of mandamus violated Section 2 of Article 
III of the Constitution.138  And another provision of the Judiciary Act required 
the Supreme Court and district judges to say the words “So help me God” when 
taking their oath of office,139 directly contravening the command of Article VI 
of the Constitution that “no religious Test shall ever be required as a 
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”140  The 
                                                 
 130. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964) (citing Sedition Act of 1798, 
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Judiciary Act was passed on September 24, 1789,141 just two years after the U.S. 
Constitution was submitted to the states for ratification (September 17, 1787)142 
and barely a year after the Constitution was ratified by enough states to become 
effective (June 21, 1788).143 
There are, unfortunately, darker and more recent examples than these of 
governmental bodies ignoring—soon after they were approved—constitutional 
provisions that governed them.  The Fourteenth Amendment was approved by 
Congress on June 13, 1866, and it was ratified on July 9, 1868.144  But barely a 
month after approving the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress passed a law 
affirming continued racial segregation of District of Columbia public schools,145 
conduct that our society has long recognized contravened the Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause.146  And by 1870, states had started to enact provisions 
requiring segregation.147  By 1878, seven states—Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, 
Missouri, North Carolina, Texas, and West Virginia—had amended their 
constitutions to require racially segregated schools, and at least two others had 
enacted statutes codifying the same. 148   Likewise, the same year that the 
Fifteenth Amendment—which guaranteed African Americans the right to 
vote—was enacted,149 states started to pass measures, such as poll taxes, that 
were plainly intended to frustrate that Amendment’s promise.150 
This troublesome history makes it difficult to define the time frame for 
historical practices that might legitimately be looked at as evincing the 
Establishment Clause’s intent.  We will not attempt to set a specific time frame, 
but we can say that the history shows this: Any action beyond the immediate 
proximity of Congress’s approval of the First Amendment on September 25, 
1789151 must be considered with some doubt.  Any action after the conclusion 
of the term of the First Congress in March 1791152 should be considered with 
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much greater doubt.  And conduct that occurred by 1798—the year of the 
enactment of the Sedition Act153—should not be considered a reliable guide. 
B. Lack of Sufficient Historical Examples of Governmental Actions that Might 
Legitimately Evince the Intent of the Establishment Clause’s Framers 
With these limitations on what conduct might legitimately be viewed as 
presumptively consistent with the intent of the Establishment Clause—federal 
governmental actions taken in 1789 or shortly thereafter—history leaves us with 
little to go on.  To be sure, we assume that history can be a useful guide in the 
legislative-prayer arena itself, given the Supreme Court’s reliance in Marsh on 
Congress’s approval of public funding of congressional chaplains three days 
before Congress’s approval of the language of the Bill of Rights, and on the 
unbroken continuation of legislative prayer in Congress since then.154  But with 
respect to most other kinds of Establishment Clause cases, there are no relevant 
examples of federal-government conduct during the relevant time frame. 155  
Most of the examples of historical conduct that advocates of a historical-practice 
test cite either were not taken by the federal government or did not occur during 
the proper time frame.156  The few instances of federal governmental actions 
concerning religion that did occur during the appropriate time frame are not 
helpful to deciding the types of Establishment Clause controversies that 
presently predominate in the courts.157 
1. Lack of Founding-Era Federal Involvement in Most Areas that Trigger 
Church-State Controversies Today 
In the late eighteenth century, the federal government simply was not involved 
in most of the contexts that trigger Establishment Clause litigation today.  Thus, 
there are no examples of federal actions that could legitimately provide courts 
with guidance under a historical-practice test in most kinds of Establishment 
Clause cases. 
Take, for example, religion in public schools, a source of frequent 
Establishment Clause conflict in the courts today.158  The federal government 
did not maintain public schools during the time period that can be legitimately 
considered under a historical-practice test.  As Justice O’Connor has pointed out, 
“free public education was virtually nonexistent in the late 18th century.”159  The 
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schools that did exist in the colonies and in the decades after the American 
Revolution were largely private and sectarian. 160   And to the extent that 
governmental bodies did provide for schooling, those bodies were state or 
local.161  The public-school system that we know today did not begin to take root 
until the 1820s and 1830s.162  The first public high school in the United States is 
generally said to have opened in Boston in 1821.163  In the South, education 
remained principally private even at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.164  And though the issue of prayer at high-school graduations is a 
common trigger for Establishment Clause lawsuits,165 according to one source 
the first public-high-school graduation ceremony did not take place until 
1868.166 
Establishment Clause cases also often concern government-sponsored 
religious displays, such as crosses,167 the Ten Commandments,168 and holiday-
season crèches.169  But the first monument erected by the federal government is 
believed to be the Tripoli Monument, which commemorates American naval 
officers who died in battle.170  That monument was erected in 1808.171  And it 
contains no religious content, beyond an inscription stating that the naval 
officers had died in “the year of our Lord, 1804.”172  Further, as Justice Kennedy 
remarked in Allegheny, “for reasons quite unrelated to the First Amendment, 
displays commemorating religious holidays were not commonplace in 1791.”173  
Indeed, beyond the brief date reference in the Tripoli Monument, court opinions 
and legal briefs that have attempted to find historical support for government-
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sponsored religious displays have not identified any religious content in any 
displays that were erected by the federal government between 1789 and 1808.174 
Another hotly contested issue today is the extent to which the Establishment 
Clause permits religious exemptions from employment-discrimination and 
public-accommodations laws.175  Of course, in the eighteenth century, there 
were no federal laws barring discrimination by employers or businesses.176  The 
relevant historical period simply offered no opportunity to speak to this 
quintessentially modern controversy. 
Beyond legislative prayer and the areas discussed above, one other type of 
Establishment Clause controversy is common today: the extent to which 
government can permissibly fund religious educational institutions and social-
service providers. 177   But this issue generally did not come up in the late 
eighteenth century either, because the federal government was not funding any 
general education or social-service programs then.178  As Douglas Laycock has 
put it, “[t]here were no programs in which government broadly funded some 
private activity that both churches and secular organizations engaged in.”179 
There is, however, one series of federal actions that proponents of public 
funding of religious education raise in support of arguments that the 
Establishment Clause was intended to permit public funding of religious 
instruction under some circumstances: federal support for missionary efforts 
among Native Americans.180  But this practice did not begin until the mid-1790s, 
and it took some time for it to evolve toward federal funding of church-operated 
schools for Native Americans: In 1795, President Washington signed a treaty 
with three tribes, promising payment to build a church.181  In 1796, the Fourth 
Congress passed a law ceding land to a religious organization for missionary 
activities. 182   In 1803, President Jefferson entered into a treaty with the 
Kaskaskia Tribe promising that the government would pay for a church and a 
                                                 
 174. See infra text accompanying notes 191–231. 
 175. See, e.g., Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 329–30 (1987); Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F. Supp. 3d 661, 685 & 
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LEXIS 175515, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2012). 
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184–85 (2012); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 10 (1883). 
 177. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000) (plurality opinion); Agostini v. 
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 208–09 (1997); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 593 (1988). 
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HARV. L. REV. 133, 142–44 (2017). 
 179. Id. at 143–44. 
 180. See id. at 144 n.90 (citing with disapproval ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH 
AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 57–80, 261–70 (1988)). 
 181. Cord, supra note 180, at 58. 
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Catholic priest “who will engage to perform for the said tribe the duties of his 
office and also to instruct as many of their children as possible in the rudiments 
of literature.”183  By the 1820s, missionaries and other religious groups on tribal 
lands were operating schools with government funding, and this practice 
continued until the late nineteenth century.184 
Public funding for missionary efforts among Native Americans is, like the 
plainly unconstitutional 1798 Sedition Act,185 better viewed as an example of 
governmental action contrary to the intent of the First Amendment than as 
evidence of the Amendment’s intent.  It commenced closer in time to the 
enactment of the Sedition Act than to the approval of the First Amendment.  
What is more, James Madison, “the leading architect of the religion clauses of 
the First Amendment,” 186  understood the Establishment Clause to strictly 
prohibit public funding for the support of religion.  In 1811, as president, 
Madison vetoed a bill that would have granted a parcel of federal land to a 
church, “[b]ecause the bill . . . comprises a principle and precedent for the 
appropriation of funds of the United States for the use and support of religious 
societies, contrary to the article of the Constitution which declares that 
‘Congress shall make no law respecting a religious establishment.’” 187  
Madison’s views against public funding of religious training were set forth at 
length in his famous 1785 Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments,188 which was written in opposition to a bill Patrick Henry had 
proposed in the Virginia Legislature that would have provided tax funding for 
“learned teachers” of “Christian knowledge,” among other aspects of religious 
ministries. 189   The Supreme Court has long recognized the Memorial and 
Remonstrance as a cornerstone document explaining the Establishment Clause’s 
intent.190 
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2. Irrelevance of Most Historical Events Relied on by Proponents of a 
Historical-Practice Test 
Like the funding of missionary work directed at Native Americans, the vast 
majority of the historical actions on which proponents of a historical-practice 
test rely are not legitimate indicators of the Establishment Clause’s intent.  The 
actions either were not taken by the federal government or did not occur close 
enough in time to Congress’s 1789 approval of the Bill of Rights.  Indeed, most 
of the cited actions took place long after 1789, some occurred before 1789, some 
were taken by state or local governments, and some were taken by private 
citizens on land that was not even part of the United States at the time. 
For example, in his opinion in Allegheny, the historical events Justice 
Kennedy cited included the Supreme Court’s practice of opening its sessions 
with “God save the United States and this honorable Court,”191 a practice that is 
not known to date back earlier than 1827;192 Congress’s creation of a prayer 
room in the Capitol,193 in 1954;194 a statute that directs the president to annually 
declare a National Day of Prayer,195 which was enacted in 1952;196 the words 
“under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance,197 which were added in 1954;198 and 
the use of “In God we trust”199 as our national motto, which dates back only to 
1956,200 and on U.S. currency, which dates back to 1864.201 
Similarly, the historical examples cited by the plurality opinion in Van Orden 
v. Perry—which addressed the constitutionality of a Ten Commandments 
display 202 —included various depictions of the Ten Commandments in the 
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Supreme Court building, 203  which was constructed in 1935; 204  a Ten 
Commandments display in the Library of Congress that dates back to 1897;205 a 
depiction of the Ten Commandments in the National Archives Building, 206 
which was constructed in the mid-1930s; 207  a depiction of the Ten 
Commandments in a 1936 statue in the Department of Justice building;208 a 1947 
statue in front of the Ronald Reagan Building that contains a depiction of the 
Ten Commandments;209 a sculpture containing the Ten Commandments and a 
cross outside the federal courthouse in Washington, D.C.,210 which opened in 
1952;211 a 1950 statue depicting Moses in the Chamber of the U.S. House of 
Representatives;212 religious references in inscriptions on or in the Washington 
Monument, 213  which was completed in 1884, 214  the Jefferson Memorial, 215 
which was dedicated in 1943, 216  and the Lincoln Memorial, 217  which was 
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dedicated in 1922;218 and the reference discussed above to “the year of our Lord, 
1804,” in the 1808 Tripoli Monument.219 
The recent concurring opinion in Kondrat’yev v. City of Pensacola—which 
advocated for a historical-practice test while addressing the constitutionality of 
a cross display220—relied on a cross erected by a Jesuit priest in upstate New 
York in 1688 “when the territory was under French control”;221 a cross erected 
by a Spanish missionary in 1782 in California,222 which did not become part of 
the United States until 1848;223 a cross erected by settlers of a Texas town in 
1847,224 the year before the United States acquired Texas;225 a cross erected in 
1858 on top of a chapel in a U.S. military fort in Virginia;226 a cross erected in 
1888 in Gettysburg National Military Park in Pennsylvania;227 a cross erected in 
1890 in the Naval Academy cemetery in Maryland;228 a cross erected in the City 
of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, in 1898;229 a cross donated to the City of Monterey, 
California, in 1905;230  and a cross erected in New Canaan, Connecticut, in 
1923.231 
The defendants in Kondrat’yev relied on these and similar examples in their 
brief.232  They also cited religious references in state constitutions during our 
Founding Era, as well as religious symbolism in the national seal—which was 
adopted in 1782, seven years before Congress’s submission of the First 
Amendment.233  Likewise, the majority of the divided panel in New Doe Child 
#1 v. United States—which used a historical-practice analysis in upholding the 
placement of “In God We Trust” on currency—relied on the statement in the 
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Declaration of Independence, which was issued thirteen years before Congress’s 
approval of the First Amendment, “that all men are . . . endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable Rights.”234   Additionally, both the New Doe Child 
majority opinion and the plurality opinion in American Legion relied on the 
statement in the Northwest Territory Ordinance, which was adopted in 1787, 
two years before approval of the First Amendment, that “[r]eligion, morality, 
and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of 
mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.”235  
Both opinions asserted that the First Congress reenacted the Northwest Territory 
Ordinance,236 but Douglas Laycock has explained that this “claim is false,” 
because the First Congress actually enacted only “two technical amendments” 
to the Ordinance, which did not include the religious references.237 
3. Impotence of the Few Historical Events that Could Properly be 
Considered Under a Historical-Practice Test 
Proponents of a historical-practice test have, to our knowledge, identified only 
two actions—and arguably a third—that are legitimate candidates for serving as 
evidence of the intent of the First Amendment’s framers because they were taken 
by the federal government sufficiently close in time to the Amendment’s 
enactment.  The first is Congress’s approval of funding of congressional 
chaplains three days before approval of the language of the Bill of Rights.238  
The second is Congress’s passage the day after the First Amendment was 
proposed of a resolution that asked the president to proclaim “a day of public 
thanksgiving and prayer, to be observed, by acknowledging, with grateful hearts, 
the many signal favours of Almighty God.”239  The third—and this one is more 
tenuous because it was approved on March 3, 1791, nearly a year and a half after 
Congress’s approval of the First Amendment (but still before the Amendment 
was ratified by the States in December 1791)—is Congress’s authorization of 
the appointment of a chaplain for the U.S. Army.240 
Before discussing whether these examples are useful to the adjudication of 
Establishment Clause controversies that relate to different issues, we emphasize 
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that it is highly questionable whether these actions in fact were consistent with 
the Establishment Clause’s intent.  The Supreme Court has regularly looked to 
the views on religious liberty of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson—the 
First Amendment’s leading architects—in ascertaining the Amendment’s 
intent.241  But after he completed his service as president, Madison wrote that 
the congressional chaplaincies violated the Establishment Clause, explaining, 
“[t]he law appointing Chaplains establishes a religious worship for the national 
representatives, to be performed by Ministers of religion, elected by a majority 
of them; and these are to be paid out of the national taxes.”242  Madison similarly 
concluded that the military chaplaincies were unconstitutional, even though he 
thought that “[t]he object of this establishment is seducing; the motive to it is 
laudable.”243  And, as president, Jefferson refused to issue Thanksgiving prayer 
proclamations because he thought that they were unconstitutional: “I consider 
the government of the United States as interdicted by the Constitution from 
intermeddling with religious institutions, their doctrines, discipline, or 
exercises.”244  Despite issuing Thanksgiving proclamations during wartime as 
president, Madison also subsequently agreed that they were contrary to the 
Establishment Clause.245  What is more, unlike opening prayers in Congress, 
which have continued since their inception,246 presidential prayer proclamations 
were issued only six times before 1862: in 1789 and 1795 by George 
Washington, in 1798 and 1799 by John Adams (these two were not on 
Thanksgiving), and in 1814 and 1815 by Madison.247 
Even if these three practices are, for the sake of argument, treated as consistent 
with the intent of the First Amendment, they shed little light on how to decide 
church-state controversies about other matters.  Legislative prayer is a 
ceremonial practice that is principally directed at legislators themselves, not the 
public.248  The Thanksgiving proclamations issued by early presidents were 
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nonsectarian, ecumenical, isolated written statements that were not presented in 
coercive environments. 249   And military chaplains have been upheld as 
constitutional on the ground that they are necessary to protect the right to free 
exercise of religion of soldiers whom the government stations at places where 
religious services would otherwise be unavailable;250 to the extent that military 
chaplains are provided to military office personnel stationed in urban areas or to 
retired military personnel, their constitutionality is in doubt, because the 
chaplains are not needed to enable these personnel to exercise their religions.251 
None of these three practices is helpful to determining how the Establishment 
Clause should be applied in the coercive environment of public schools, to 
permanent and prominent sectarian displays on public property, to requests on 
religious grounds for exemptions from anti-discrimination laws, or to the 
provision of substantial sums of public funds to private religious institutions.  
Thus, with respect to the Establishment Clause cases that typically confront 
courts today (other than legislative-prayer cases), there is simply not enough 
relevant history for a historical-practice analysis to be workable. 
And even if there were more relevant examples of early federal-government 
conduct that might legitimately be treated as consistent with the Establishment 
Clause’s intent, a historical-practice test would still give little guidance in cases 
that do not address specific practices that go back to our country’s Founding Era.  
As formulated by Justice Kennedy in Allegheny, a historical-practice test 
apparently would ask whether a challenged practice has a “greater potential for 
an establishment of religion” than “legitimate practices two centuries old.”252  
How is a court to assess whether one practice has a “greater potential for an 
establishment of religion” than another?  Such a “standard” would provide much 
less guidance to courts—and would be much more susceptible to capricious “we 
know it when we see it” application—than the purpose, effect, and entanglement 
prohibitions of the oft-criticized253 Lemon test. 
IV. PROPER USE OF HISTORY IN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS 
Though governmental actions that followed the adoption of the First 
Amendment are generally not the right events to consider, we do not contend 
that there should be no role for history in Establishment Clause analysis.  The 
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historical guides courts should look at instead are the events that triggered the 
Establishment Clause’s creation, and the writings of the leading thinkers behind 
the Clause—Madison and Jefferson.254  And such historical analysis does not 
require wholesale changes in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  Far from it.  
For the Supreme Court has already used such analysis to derive existing 
Establishment Clause rules. 
Indeed, the Court did so in its 1947 decision Everson v. Board of Education,255 
the first case that applied the Establishment Clause to the states, 256  which 
considered the constitutionality of a township’s practice of paying for bus 
transportation to private, religious schools.  The Court “review[ed] the 
background and environment of the period in which [the Establishment Clause] 
was fashioned and adopted,” describing the “conditions and practices which [the 
early Americans] fervently wished to stamp out in order to preserve liberty for 
themselves and for their posterity,” and the “evils, fears, and political problems 
that caused [the Establishment Clause] to be written into our Bill of Rights.”257  
The Court detailed the religious strife that led American colonists to leave 
Europe, how that strife persisted in the colonies, and how it ultimately fostered 
among the colonists the belief that “individual religious liberty could be 
achieved best under a government which was stripped of all power to tax, to 
support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions, or to interfere with the beliefs 
of any religious individual or group.”258 
The Court focused particularly on the writings of James Madison and Thomas 
Jefferson in opposition to continued taxation for the support of religion in 
Virginia, exemplified by Patrick Henry’s 1784 proposal of a bill for that 
purpose. 259   Madison wrote in response his landmark Memorial and 
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, which 
eloquently argued that a true religion did not need the support of law; 
that no person, either believer or non-believer, should be taxed to 
support a religious institution of any kind; that the best interest of a 
society required that the minds of men always be wholly free; and that 
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cruel persecutions were the inevitable result of government-
established religions.260 
And Jefferson wrote the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, which likewise 
powerfully advocated against governmental support for, coercion of, 
discrimination based on, and other involvement with religion.261  The Court 
explained that “the provisions of the First Amendment, in the drafting and 
adoption of which Madison and Jefferson played such leading roles, had the 
same objective and were intended to provide the same protection against 
governmental intrusion on religious liberty as the Virginia statute.”262 
Then, drawing on this history, the Court listed a set of fundamental 
Establishment Clause rules: 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.  
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or 
prefer one religion over another.  Neither can force nor influence a 
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force 
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.  No person can be 
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, 
for church attendance or non-attendance.  No tax in any amount, large 
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or 
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may 
adopt to teach or practice religion.  Neither a state nor the Federal 
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any 
religious organizations or groups and vice versa.263 
“In the words of Jefferson,” concluded the Court, “the clause against 
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation 
between Church and State.’”264 
Fifteen years later, in Engel v. Vitale, the Court again rested its analysis in a 
foundational Establishment Clause case on an examination of the historical 
abuses that the Clause’s framers meant to prevent.265  In that decision, the Court 
struck down a public school district’s policy of requiring the recitation of a 
prayer, composed by state officials, at the beginning of each school day.266  Most 
of the Court’s opinion was devoted to discussion of European and colonial 
practices that the Establishment Clause was intended to prohibit.267  The Court 
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recounted how the government of England established a church and prescribed 
particular prayers and religious exercises, how early colonists came to America 
to escape such practices, how some colonies established similar practices 
themselves, the persecution and division that resulted, how Madison and 
Jefferson led opposition in Virginia against governmental support of or 
involvement with religion in response, and how the Establishment Clause was 
intended to prevent these kinds of practices.268  Looking to this history, the Court 
concluded that the “first and most immediate purpose” of the Establishment 
Clause “rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to 
destroy government and to degrade religion.”269  And, added the Court, “[w]hen 
the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a 
particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious 
minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.”270 
The following year, in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, the 
Court struck down enactments requiring that public-school days begin with 
Bible readings or prayer recitations.271  The Court again discussed the history of 
religious strife in Europe and the colonies, more briefly than in Everson and 
Engel, but pointing to those decisions as providing additional detail.272  The 
Court summed up that history thus: “Nothing but the most telling of personal 
experiences in religious persecution suffered by our forebears . . . could have 
planted our belief in liberty of religious opinion any more deeply in our 
heritage.” 273   As a result, noted the Court, “the views of Madison and 
Jefferson”—leading supporters of that liberty—”came to be incorporated . . . in 
the Federal Constitution.”274  The Establishment Clause mandates governmental 
neutrality toward religion, the Court added, based on 
a recognition of the teachings of history that powerful sects or groups 
might bring about a fusion of governmental and religious functions or 
a concert or dependency of one upon the other to the end that official 
support of the State or Federal Government would be placed behind 
the tenets of one or of all orthodoxies.275 
Drawing on this history, the Court described two familiar Establishment 
Clause principles: 
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and primary 
effect of the enactment?  If either is the advancement or inhibition of 
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religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as 
circumscribed by the Constitution.  That is to say that to withstand the 
strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular 
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion.276 
These purpose and effect rules, together with the prohibition against religious 
entanglement discussed in Engel, serve as the core of the well-known Lemon 
test.277 
In numerous subsequent cases, the Supreme Court relied on pre-Revolution 
history and the writings of Madison and Jefferson to interpret the Establishment 
Clause.  In Flast v. Cohen, for example, citing Madison and noting that “[o]ur 
history vividly illustrates that one of the specific evils feared by those who 
drafted the Establishment Clause and fought for its adoption was that the taxing 
and spending power would be used to favor one religion over another or to 
support religion in general,” the Court explained that “[t]he Establishment 
Clause was designed as a specific bulwark against such potential abuses of 
governmental power.” 278   In Committee for Public Education & Religious 
Liberty v. Nyquist, the Court relied on Madison’s rebuke of Patrick Henry’s 
proposal to fund religious ministries in Virginia to support a conclusion that 
public funding of religious education is prohibited even when it partially aids 
secular goals. 279   In Larson v. Valente, the Court looked to European and 
colonial historical abuses and the writings of Madison to derive the principle that 
“[t]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious 
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”280  In his majority 
opinion in Lee v. Weisman, Justice Kennedy cited Madison’s writings in 
explaining that the Establishment Clause, among other purposes, “exist[s] to 
protect religion from government interference.”281 
More recently, in its 2005 decision McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 
the Supreme Court cited the history of religious conflict in England and the 
colonies as support for reaffirming the principle that “the government may not 
favor one religion over another, or religion over irreligion.”282  In his 2011 
majority opinion in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 
Justice Kennedy looked to Madison’s writings to describe the injury taxpayers 
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suffer when their money is taken to aid religious institutions.283  And in his 2012 
opinion for a unanimous court in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church 
& School v. EEOC, Chief Justice Roberts examined English and colonial history 
and the writings of Madison to support a holding that government must not 
become involved in the selection of ministers.284 
V. CONCLUSION 
As the foregoing cases illustrate, by considering the historical abuses that the 
Establishment Clause was meant to prevent, and the writings of the leading 
thinkers behind the Clause, the Supreme Court has formulated a host of clear 
and specific rules for interpreting it.  These rules protect values and principles at 
the heart of the Clause, which—in today’s pluralistic society—are even more 
important than they were in 1789: the government must not discriminate against 
anyone based on their religion or lack of faith; the government must not pressure 
or influence anyone to take part in religious activities; the government must not 
fund religious education or ministry; the government must not interfere with or 
become involved in the affairs of religious institutions; the government must not 
permit its power to be wielded in the service of theological goals.285 
Replacing existing Establishment Clause jurisprudence with a test that 
measures challenged practices against post-1789 historical practices not only 
would provide courts with wholly insufficient guidance but also would put these 
core Establishment Clause values at great risk.  The few Founding Era historical 
practices that might—at least arguably—be legitimately viewed as consistent 
with the intent of the Clause’s framers provide little guidance in most 
Establishment Clause areas, and thus little protection for the rights that the 
Clause was intended to guard.  And other historical actions that proponents of a 
historical-practice test rely on—non-federal actions and actions insufficiently 
close to 1789—can easily reflect conduct by politicians who ignored the Clause 
or were never bound by it, instead of validly evincing the Clause’s intent.  
Relying on such actions could eviscerate Establishing Clause values instead of 
vindicating them.  And that use of history would betray—and risk repeating—
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